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WAR GAMING IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Theory and Purpose
Paul Bracken and Martin Shubik
Over twenty years ago, a study was carried out under the sponsorship of theDefense Advanced Research Projects Agency and in collaboration with
the General Accounting Office to survey and critique the models, simulations,
and war games then in use by the Department of Defense.1 From some points of
view, twenty years ago means ancient history; changes in communication tech-
nology and computers since then can be measured
only in terms of orders of magnitudes. The new world
of the networked battlefield, super-accurate weapons,
and the information technology (IT) revolution, with its
instant communication and seamless feedback, seems
as far away from the mud of trench warfare in Flanders
field as World War I was from the battle of Agincourt.
The present era in society, business, and warfare
has been called “the information age,” and with good
reason, given the extraordinary influence that the
exponential advances in information technology and
the increasing accuracy and lethality of weaponry
have had on these institutions. But human beings
and their biological data-processing, interpreting,
and decision-making abilities have not changed at the
rates of these impressive technologies. Indeed, they
have not changed at all. Neither has the new technol-
ogy changed the purposes of, or the principles behind,
war gaming. It has added new problems, however,
and it has made even more difficult the resolution of
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enduring problems that were critical twenty years ago. Notwithstanding the in-
disputable benefits of many forms of gaming, formal model building, and simu-
lations, it appears that these sciences—as was the case with operations research,
the behavioral sciences, and artificial intelligence (and now “complexity the-
ory”)—were heavily oversold and their promise rashly overestimated in the
1960s and 1970s.
From their introduction by William McCarty Little in 1886, only manual war
games were played at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, until
1958, when the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator was built, heralding a new
era in war gaming by tying it to the computer. Others were to develop this link to
ever greater degrees. The expansion of new gaming centers at the Air War Col-
lege, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, National Defense University,
and at the Joint Forces Command (until October 1999 the U.S. Atlantic Com-
mand), along with the growth of for-profit consulting companies, helped to
spread computer-based gaming and led to advances in war gaming and military
operations research. These developments were not an unmixed blessing, however.
Along with the greater ability to handle complexity and administrative detail
came a potential for loss of “transparency”—awareness by players of a game’s
underlying assumptions—and a temptation to add “realistic features” to games,
because it was so technologically easy to do so, without thinking much about
whether the additions added to or detracted from the games’ underlying pur-
poses. The push for added complexity rarely came from the people who thought
games were a good way to test concepts or plans. Rather, it originated mainly
from the technical community of analysts and gamers. There is now a divide be-
tween an increasingly specialized community of gamers and modelers on the
one hand, and policy makers on the other; this divide is greater today than it was
in the 1970s. Gamers have to market their capabilities the way any business does.
There is nothing wrong with this, per se. But experience indicates that this mar-
keting, and much of gaming’s development over the past twenty years, has been
aimed at other gamers rather than the policy-making community. It has been
aimed even less at casting light on new challenges to U.S. security management,
challenges that barely existed twenty years ago.
Why has this happened? The reasons are, first, that with computer-driven
games it becomes easy to hide layer upon layer of complexity behind user inter-
faces that few people understand; and second, that the impact on the policy pro-
cess of program “modules” that are opaque to players is not considered. There is
much to commend simplicity, in light of the inherent limitation of human data
processing, especially when dealing with decision makers. With manual war
games, it was not feasible to add “bells, whistles, and gongs”; careful thought was
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required in designing every single move in the sparse abstraction that consti-
tuted a game.
Over the last twenty years, however, models, simulations, and games have
merged with each other. The boundaries separating them are no longer clear,
making overall assessment far more difficult. Modeling has become more com-
plex, but thinking has not. The
very unreality of manual games
made them real, in the sense that
it forced attention to key ques-
tions. That is why simple board
games, like the Kriegspiel, were adopted by European general staffs in the nine-
teenth century. Playing them sharpened everyone’s tactical and strategic sense.
As Karl von Mueffling, the chief of the General Staff of the Prussian army, de-
clared in 1824, at the very start of war gaming, “It’s not a game at all, it’s a train-
ing for war; I shall recommend it most emphatically to the whole army.” Asked
what games they like to play and what strategists they read, today’s Chinese gen-
erals give an illuminating answer: they play Go and read Sun Tzu, because be-
neath their surface simplicity, the generals tell us, “there is great complexity.”2
The advances in gaming since its inception have been large, whether we con-
sider table games at the platoon level, tactical exercises, theater games, or political-
military games up to the level of global war. But despite the greater complexity and
technology, many old problems remain, and have even been magnified. The fascina-
tion with analytics and the attractiveness of trying to quantify phenomena we do
not know how to describe accurately, let alone measure, suppresses many phenom-
ena that may be of the essence in the darkness, turmoil, and confusion of real war.
CNN pictures of “smart” missiles homing in on targets hardly convey the factors of
morale, bravery, improvisation, trust, and the many others that weave a great armed
force together.
As yet, computers do not provide wisdom. Seasoned, nonpartisan referees
like Frank McHugh, military historians with the skills of a Harvey DeWeerd, and
operational analysts of the quality of an Edward Paxon of RAND—all names
that are likely unknown to the current war-gaming community—were once able
to provide experiential depth that is still needed but is now harder to obtain than
ever. A striking feature of the current gaming environment in contrast to that of
two and three decades ago is the absence of generalists with an overview of both
gaming technology and the decision-making process by which things actually
get done. This is not just carping about the good old days: such generalist out-
looks are now being applied to, and revolutionizing, a different field. Informa-
tion technology is transforming business processes precisely because “e-business”
has emphasized the I in IT—the information, not the technology. Managers who
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understand corporate decision processes and market requirements have gotten
their hands around corporate IT systems and wrestled them away from the tech-
nicians. The ongoing transformation of American business proves that this can
be done and what it can achieve. A similar process in war gaming should begin.
THEORY AND WAR GAMING
The three decades after the great contributions of technology and analysis to
winning World War II—contributions symbolized by the atom bomb, opera-
tions research, and cryptography—were heady, optimistic years for the applica-
tion of computers to national defense. The driving idea was that a machine, the
computer, would scale upward the analyses then being invented in the diverse
fields of artificial intelligence, operations research, game theory, simulation, and
formal organizational theory. The brave, new, modern world had dawned.
Whole new organizations were built, because the “old” ones did not get the
message. Think tanks like the RAND Corporation and the Hudson Institute en-
tered their golden ages. The first Monte Carlo (probabilistic) simulations made
their appearance, and bigger and better digital models were immediately planned.
The optimism was such that the Systems Development Corporation was spun
off by RAND to perform simulations of unprecedented scale. The Office of Na-
val Research was “Lady Bountiful” to students of relevant theory. The Advanced
Research Projects Agency supported consultants and researchers in manage-
ment science and decision theory. The spirit of the times was that all problems
would fall to analysis or simulation within the next decade.
The work of the mathematician John von Neumann on the representation of
the anatomy of games by “game trees” and that of Claude Shannon on informa-
tion theory provided for the first time a notation for, and understanding of,
microstructure information flows, as well as a scientific method for investigat-
ing the basis of decision making. Herbert Simon predicted that the world chess
championship would soon fall to a computer. The faculty at Carnegie Tech
would provide business with scientific means for management. Robert McNamara
was to do the same, first at the Ford Motor Company, then at the Department of
Defense.
The progress made in those days, and afterward, was real and impressive, but the
Cerebus paradox was soon encountered: every time a problem was solved, several
more unsolved problems sprang up to replace it. The statement that various key
problems in the decision sciences or in artificial intelligence would be solved “next
year”turned out to involve, in effect, a DO LOOP where NEXT = NEXT + 1. A prediction
in 1970 from Marvin Minsky, a pioneer in artificial intelligence, shows the point:
5 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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In from three to eight years, we will have a machine with the general intelligence of
an average human being. I mean a machine that will be able to read Shakespeare,
grease a car, play office politics, tell a joke, have a fight. At that point, the machine
will begin to educate itself with fantastic speed. In a few months, it will be at genius
level, and a few months after that, its power will be incalculable.3
Our perspective, nevertheless, is not pessimistic. On the contrary, the tools
that prompted such predictions had given means to attack a vast array of basic
and previously unapproachable problems. The early successes and the quantum
leaps taken created a Camelot-like
feeling of invincibility. A funda-
mental understanding of human
behavior was presumed to be just
around the corner. However, the
early attempts to simulate check-
ers and chess, or to attach artificial arms and eyes to computers and tell them to
pick up building blocks and put them on top of other ones, showed that far
deeper and more subtle problems were involved than had been thought.
The same thing happened in war gaming and game theory. Far from solving
all problems of human interactions, the knowledge yielded by game theory
helped to demonstrate that simplistic concepts of optimal strategies and rational
behavior were highly limited in application. In the new game models there was
no morale; leadership had no meaning; passion and anger could not be por-
trayed. The simplification of the individual to a mechanistic decision maker
stripped these away, and with it virtually all of the qualities that a good war col-
lege tries to instill.
Nuclear war games, for example, were built around grand optimization
across the major commands responsible for these weapons, becoming giant linear-
programming routines for building “optimal” nuclear strike plans. The very
names of the models—such as the “Arsenal Exchange Model”—suggested mu-
tual silo-emptyings, the launching of thousands of missiles to destroy the other
side’s forces. Models were built of sufficient scale to manage such exchanges, but
too much was left out that was important. The behavior of the isolated com-
manders with thousands of megatons under their control;4 the reaction of Nato
allies to having World War III fought through the suburban sprawl of Europe; and
whether the Polish army should be counted in the “Red” or “Blue” order of bat-
tle—all these issues were conveniently left out of models and games. These “gaps,”
however, happened to be the points of greatest concern to decision makers.
Formal game-theoretic analysis has an important cautionary lesson to teach
here. A simple analysis of any multistage game of even moderate complexity
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(chess will do) shows us that even in so simple a case, human data-processing ca-
pacities and perceptions rule out unrestricted proliferation of information. The
human being is a sophisticated but limited-capacity processor of information
and can deal with voluminous input only if it is aggregated, or “chunked.” The
human is a social animal, for whom “know who” counts as much as, if not more
than, “know how.”
Another limitation concerns communication, the complexity of which is il-
lustrated by an age-old military problem, the command and control of a multi-
national army—that is, an army composed of many national or ethnic parts.
(This problem is becoming important once again, with coalition wars on the
rise.) In 1918, officers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire barked orders first in
German and then in four other languages in quick succession if they wished to
convey to their troops what they had in mind.5 With differences in language
come differences in cultural perceptions and in shared knowledge and customs,
and considerable potential for misinterpretation. New technologies speed the
transmission of symbols and facilitate computation, but they hardly influence
the interpretation of meaning, the discernment of patterns, or the drawing of
inferences from complex, noisy contextual data.
In terms of the future of war gaming, developments in theory bring the mes-
sage that the major improvements are needed less in technology, in “newer toys
for bigger boys,” than in persuasively written scenarios, assessments of why play-
ers did what they did, and postgame debriefings of what was actually learned.
The gold lies in human thought—assisted by modern communication and com-
puters, not distracted by them. An emerging appreciation of the complexity of
human behavior has humbled the decision sciences, and it has simultaneously
made them more useful, as their practitioners gain better and more realistic feel-
ings for the scope and limits of their crafts.
ENDURING ISSUES
That there are new challenges in war gaming does not mean that all of the old
challenges have been met. On the contrary, the long-standing problems of
thinking through a game’s purpose and drawing lessons from it are handled no
better today than thirty years ago. In some cases, this failing is made worse by the
inappropriate application of new gaming technology and by failure to under-
stand its proper uses.
One aspect of failure to think through fundamental purposes is an inability
to make the basic distinction between the explicit game being played and the im-
plicit one. The explicit game is the official event, the one presented in the brief-
ing book and described in the orientation lecture that precedes game play.
Should a new weapon system be upgraded? Will North Korea fire its weapons of
5 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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mass destruction? Illuminating such questions is an explicit purpose of war
games. But very often, equally or even more important implicit games are being
played at the same time. This is the game that cannot be mentioned in the offi-
cial briefing, the one that asks questions that are too sensitive to pose explicitly
but that savvy players recognize are the really important ones—fundamental is-
sues of strategy and cost.
In the late 1930s, Joseph Stalin had his generals game the defense of the Soviet
Union against German attack. Stalin ordered the conditions of defense precisely:
massed troops on the border in a linear defense. The more perceptive Soviet gen-
erals knew that such a defense would mean disaster in the event of German
attack, an intuition that turned
out to be correct. They also knew
what defying Stalin by playing an-
other strategy in the official game
would mean. They played the lin-
ear defense in the official game, because they had no choice; however, they also
held after-hours conversations about the consequences of following the official
plan, and they staged informal, verbal games based on the official one but relax-
ing the political constraints. This is a common phenomenon known as “shadow
gaming.”6 The most interesting questions are frequently not officially reflected
in the game but are nonetheless implicitly understood and become part of the
tacit knowledge that players take away. Yet there is almost no analytical attention
given to the shadow game, even to its identification of issues.
Tacit knowledge often concerns what players thought they were doing and
what players would have done if the game had taken another path. It is almost
never mined for its full value. This is a problem that has been made worse by the
nature of many decision-support systems (DSSs) used in games. In practice,
most DSSs focus on explicit prospective choices without going back and retrac-
ing alternative courses of action. They overlook retrospective choices and the
sensitivity of later decisions to earlier ones.
Most DSSs also stick with official rules past the point where this makes sense.
Consider the target-identification problem. When a war goes badly, confusion
increases, and objectives slip out of reach, the rules governing the identification
of permissible targets begin to change. Fire discipline erodes. In a highly con-
strained war like the air campaign against Serbia, there are three things on the
battlefield: friends, foes, and neutrals. But as the Vietnam War showed, once
matters start to deteriorate, the boundaries between these distinct categories
begin to blur, especially between neutrals and friends or foes. This is a very im-
portant issue, because that particular distinction not only forms the basis of
much current strategy—victory with minimal collateral damage—but has led
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militaries to acquire very expensive surveillance and targeting systems, and
highly accurate weapons. The ways in which these systems could fail in circum-
stances in which victory seems attainable only with considerable collateral dam-
age depend on different paths taken in a game. But these contingencies are almost
never analyzed, and they are not captured by extant DSSs, whose rules stay fixed
throughout a game.
In the corporate world of e-business, however, the distinction between ex-
plicit and tacit knowledge is central to knowledge management.7 Capturing and
codifying tacit knowledge is a high priority in corporate America, because it is a
major source of competitive advantage.8 Yet although they now use similar tech-
nologies (Groupware, Expert Systems, Neural Nets), war games achieve little
payoff compared to what is taking place in business.
NEW CHALLENGES
If over the last twenty to thirty years both principles and purposes in gaming
have remained the same, technology has of course changed, and so have many
problems (in part because of the change in technology), problems that require
new kinds of analysis in which gaming could be of great use. The greatest of these
new challenges are: the revolution in military affairs; weapons of mass destruction;
multipolarity, and the rise of Asian military power; the issue of the nation-state as
the central actor in international affairs; information warfare; and international
financial linkages and financial warfare.
Whether or not one accepts the argument that the United States is now at the
beginning of a revolution in military affairs (RMA), it seems clear that techno-
logical enhancements in the form of precision strike weapons, information war-
fare, and systems of unparalleled interconnectedness mark a change in the nature
of warfare, a change that is fundamental. It is important to assess the conse-
quences of this change at several levels: strategic, operational, organizational, and
technical.
The current art of war gaming is not up to the job. Partly this is because the
problems are inherently difficult; but it is also because of an absence of profes-
sionals trained or willing to cross over into different intellectual fields. Broadly
speaking, strategists and policy experts do little or no analysis whatever; they
simply posit sweeping portraits of the future, basing them on the changing na-
ture of war or the structure of the international system. On the other hand, tech-
nical people with specialized training in software and war gaming are seduced
into emphasizing the use of these tools rather than focusing their attention on
the real problems of a revolution in military affairs.
In practice, games that try to analyze an American RMA tend to leave out too
much, such as the highly plausible response on the part of other countries of
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simply accelerating their adoption of weapons of mass destruction. A case can
be made that this is now taking place, without anyone acknowledging it. The
high-profile use of high-tech U.S. forces against Iraq, Serbia, and others is
producing in many countries a
sense that they cannot possibly
compete on these terms; rather
than giving up and accepting
American power, they search for a
“poor man’s RMA” in biological
and nuclear weapons. This is not to argue for a low-tech American approach.
But it is striking that the “poor man’s” counter to high technology has not been
seriously gamed, as to either its system-transforming effects or its operational
ones. Fortunately, and notwithstanding the near misses of the Aum Shinri Kyo
in Japan in 1995 and the Iraqi weapons programs in 1991, no use of biological or
nuclear weapons has taken place. But the potentials are enormous and horren-
dous, and our experiential base is negligible.
The rise of Asian military power, as reflected in the adaptation of ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction in a connected belt of countries ex-
tending from Israel to North Korea, is a related development that cries out for
broader gaming and analysis. For five hundred years the West has militarily
dominated Asia by gaining control of bases on the continent’s maritime rim and
by exploiting a technological advantage. It was a classic competition between the
strategies of Halford Mackinder and Alfred Mahan—the former an advocate of
continental land power, the latter the father of American maritime supremacy.9
Military geography itself is almost extinct as a subject area in the United States,
replaced by a myth of the “death of distance” and an assumption that a United
States able to keep its technological lead will also be able to sustain indefinitely a
five-hundred-year status quo in Asia.10
There is little evidence of gaming of the competition between continental
and maritime strategies. Missiles armed with mass-destruction warheads un-
dermine the Western Mahanian strategy. Bases on which U.S. military power re-
lies, and perhaps even the capital ships that enforce presence, are exposed to
unprecedented dangers. Should the United States protect these forward bases
with theater-ballistic-missile defenses? Will the cost of staying forward in Asia
go up sharply as a result? These are questions that either have not been examined
at all or have been looked at only in the narrow tactical context of the kill proba-
bilities of interceptor missiles.
One of the great contributions of game theory has been to the study of the
two-person game. In the Cold War, the development of the two-person,
zero-sum game fit in naturally with worst-case scenarios and evaluations of
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“Red” capabilities; in addition, the literature on two-person, non-zero-sum
games brought to light many paradoxes in the estimation of threats and the role
of communication. All of this work and the gaming carried out in parallel with it
applied nicely to a bipolar world of the United States versus the Soviet Union.
Although there were many allies involved, the “Blue bloc versus the Red bloc”
supplied a good first-order approximation. Since the dissolution of the Soviet
empire and the growth of the Asia-Pacific powers, this easy simplification into
two-person games has become impossible. The multipolar world is far more
difficult to study, from every point of view. Such problems as nuclear stability
become far more complex when formally extended from two players to a multi-
polar world. The complications in analytics are computational and combinatoric.
The complications in global strategy are more conceptual and judgmental, in-
volving the guessing of, say, likely North Korean reactions or the future behavior
of the Israelis or Palestinians.
As for the nation-state, we are all its creatures, and Americans in particular
take it as an axiom that their nation is the “great melting pot.” There are Ameri-
cans of many races, colors, and creeds. But the nation’s very self-image depends
on trying to perfect the imperfect, the unfortunate reality of prejudice against
various minorities. We cannot, therefore, dismiss the influence of communica-
tions on the “global village.” With the growth of the Internet and international
enterprise, the concept of the “inhabitant of the global village,” of the citizen of
the world, takes on new meaning. This is a matter not only of rhetoric and ideol-
ogy but of basic social structure.
Today, a computer-literate immigrant to the United States never really leaves
home. The very term “immigrant” confuses place with space. A computer pro-
grammer in Palo Alto (a place) who recently migrated from India may be in con-
tinuous touch with his family in Bangalore or with his former employers in the
defense ministry in New Delhi (a space). The Dutch president of a U.S.-German
conglomerate newly merged with a French-Italian-Japanese holding company
may stress his loyalties to his international stockholders, but when one can no
longer tell where the lines are, it is difficult to decide what side one is on. In a
multi-allegiance world, an Iraqi dictator finds little difficulty in buying oil pipe-
lines that look surprisingly like three-hundred-foot gun barrels, designed by an
engineer holding a Canadian passport but whose national identity is more akin
to that of Werner von Braun than that of a citizen of a single country.
World financial markets have been interlinking at breakneck speed. In many
aspects of finance there is in essence a world market. A transaction in Japan can
be felt in New York as though it occurred locally. There has been some concern
that this interlinkage opens the door for a new form of economic warfare in-
volving the destabilizing of markets and the deliberate creation of panics. The
5 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/6
evidence is not clear. Recent studies raise questions concerning the difficulties of
destabilizing markets, notwithstanding popular fiction by Tom Clancy (Debt of
Honor) and other writers.11 Games that have brought in actual “inside play-
ers”—representatives of leading Wall Street banks and brokerages—seem to
show that it is difficult to spread such disruption in the massively redundant
marketplace.12 Financial warfare games also show, in an unintended way, how
financial priorities overtake foreign policy goals—a subject in need of much
more careful analysis.
The new implications of information warfare involve misinformation and
deception more than they evoke images of seamlessly functioning operations
rooms with hundreds of well dressed and unflappable control personnel facing
consoles and multimedia wall-display screens reminiscent of Dr. Strangelove. In
a day when television can make nonexistent billboards (with advertisements for
sponsors) seem to appear in Times Square during television coverage on New
Year’s Eve, the old adage that “the camera does not lie” no longer offers the com-
fort it did in the days when film-doctoring was an expensive and difficult art.
Paradoxically, the growth of information technology is more and more in the fa-
vor of disinformation technology, thanks to naive users who concentrate more
on the technological wonder of the information displayed than on the context of
who generated it and what it means.13
The theatrical aspects of military action have been grist for postmodern
scholars—a literature that is unknown to the gaming community.14 Yet the close
connection between visual stimulation (and manipulation) and games is well
understood by Las Vegas casino operators, successful politicians, and designers
of commercial video games (such as “Rainbow 6” and “Civilization”). Man is
a visual animal. The imminent availability of broadband technology and
Internet2® means that on-demand video will be as thoroughly taken for granted
in the future as telephones were in the 1950s.15 This undoubtedly has many
important implications for war gaming.
DANGERS PERCEIVED AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
The explosive growth of communication in the information age, whether in mil-
itary or corporate organizations, has created a pressing need to game the bu-
reaucratic process in its assorted pathological behaviors, jurisdictional turf
battles, time delays, miscommunications, autogenerated mistakes, and propen-
sities for random estimates, disinformation, and information vandalism.
U.S. government “estimates” of likely Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopter
attrition in the 1999 war in Kosovo illustrate this need better than any fictional
scenario ever could. In that campaign a major innovation was real-time
teleconferencing, by which field commanders collectively estimated that there
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would be five losses per hundred sorties for the Apache were it committed to
combat against Serb military forces in Kosovo. At the Pentagon, this estimate
was somehow turned into a 6-to-15 percent attrition rate; whether this growth
occurred through miscommunication or reassessment using different analytical
tools is not known. This higher
number was used to brief the Na-
tional Command Authorities
(that is, the president and secre-
tary of defense) on whether to
employ the Apaches. At the White
House the figure was again either
miscommunicated or somehow recalibrated; one senior official thought he was
told to anticipate a 50 percent attrition rate. Given the political sensitivity to ca-
sualties in this operation, it was not hard to guess where this would lead. The
Army had already moved twenty-four Apaches to Albania—along with fourteen
M-1 tanks, two Bradley fighting vehicles, twenty trucks, and thirty-seven trans-
port helicopters to support them—using 550 sorties of the C-17 cargo aircraft,
as well as sea lift. In all, the Army had sent 6,200 troops and twenty-six thousand
tons of equipment to support the Apache deployment. But when senior political
leaders saw the attrition estimates (5 percent? 15 percent? 50 percent?), this im-
mense effort went for naught. The combat mission for the Apaches was killed
outright; they never flew in battle.
Strategic-bureaucracy games with a minimum of three or four teams playing
the roles of different departments, with communication between them imper-
fect, the noise level high, and autogeneration of mistakes likely, might make a
convincing case that these problems must be rectified. There are solutions. The
QVC Home Shopping Network, Goldman Sachs, and other firms operate process-
ing systems that integrate and stabilize their bureaucratic behavior, at least for
mission-critical tasks. What they have done is carefully examine information, not
just technology, and connect business knowledge with technical expertise.
Defense organizations, of course, face a hazard that most corporations do
not—threats to security. The concern is less with the adequacy of 128-bit en-
cryption systems than with “moles,” secretly working for opposing players. In
the information age, moles can have devastating effects, because these agents
work to reveal the keys to technical systems that take many years to field and that
are increasingly at the heart of American competitive advantage over other
countries. Consider the consequences of a Klaus Fuchs, Aldrich Ames, Jonathan
Pollard, or a Ronald Pelton. Pelton, a National Security Agency technician, gave
away the capabilities and coverage gaps of a multibillion-dollar U.S. surveillance
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program. Inclusion of moles should be a consideration in future war game
design.
There is also a need for a class of games that go beyond the traditional politico-
military crisis exercise. There should be a renewed emphasis on “path
games”—in which strategic decisions are made sequentially over an extended
time frame, in an attempt to illuminate long-range consequences—in a collabo-
rative effort among the war colleges, the Defense Department, and the academic
community. These games should stress ten-to-twenty-year branching scenarios.
At a time when the United States is the sole superpower, there is a dangerous
tendency to focus only on short-term crises, overlooking the complicated and
varied ways that the nation’s preeminence could be challenged. It is one thing to
look at missile defenses to protect South Korea, Japan, or Taiwan against attack;
the twenty-year implications of deploying theater-missile-defense systems to
Asia and the Middle East are a very different matter. Such issues have not been
examined even in terms of obvious measures, like the economic damage-
exchange ratio of a protracted missile-antimissile competition. It would be
extremely interesting in particular to run, on theater missile deployments in
Asia, a twenty-year path game that included a Pelton-like mole on the “Blue”
team, someone who could reveal the technical performance characteristics and
vulnerabilities of the deployed antimissile system to an opposing player.
War gaming has had a distinguished past and should have an important and dis-
tinguished future. This future depends on conceiving computer games and
strategy as complements to one another. There is an unfortunate tendency to
conceive of them instead as substitutes. Successful IT companies do not make
this fundamental mistake. Nearly all of them have obliged information technol-
ogy to support the businesses, rather than the other way around.
Improvements in computing and simulation make “soft gaming,” such as the
politico-military exercise, more important than ever. Because supporting infor-
mation—the distance between Saigon and Seattle, or the population within a
ten-mile radius of the center of Seoul—can now be obtained almost instantly,
more time should be spent examining the nuances of scenarios, and more re-
sources should be aimed at exploiting the assistance that military history, politi-
cal science, and social psychology can offer.
There will always be enough money for highly computerized tactical games
and simulations in the budgets of the proponents of various weapons systems.
Unfortunately, the more strategic the problem, the harder it is to obtain funding
to examine it. Is that because the outcomes of such studies do not look like the
crisp, quantified “deliverables” of technical consultants?
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